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The challenge of Labor Mobility 














Less than two decades after emerging from an ambivalent period of “eurosclerosis”, and 
after recently adopting a brand new common currency, the European Union is preparing 
for a decisive transformation. Possibly as early as 2004, the European Union will begin 
admitting up to 10 new members, mainly originating from the former “eastern” block
1.  
 
For European “optimists”, the possible acceptance of the “eastern” block will prove that 
such bold moves are not only possible but also compatible with the current process of 
deepening at work in the European Union. For others, though, the emergence of such a 
heterogeneous European Union could generate economic and political disruptions on a 
scale that may jeopardize the whole process of integration. One question in particular 
reflects these fears: the capacity of the EU to enforce the central principle of the free 
movement of people after enlargement. Is it realistic to allow workers from the new 
members to immediately benefit from the freedom of movement? Or is it necessary to 
limit this freedom or mitigate its effects, at least in the short-term?  
 
Migration issues are certainly nothing new for many current EU members. After 1945, 
virtually all countries in Western Europe began to attract significant numbers of workers 
from abroad. Although the initial migrants were principally from southern Europe, the 
                                                 
1 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (the CC8), Cyprus and Malta. 
Bulgaria and Romania aspire to accede a few years later. In the case of Turkey, the perspective of accession is even 
more remote.  3
situation changed in the 1960’s with the emergence of massive flows of workers from 
regions such as northern Africa and Turkey. By the 1980’s, on the other hand, countries 
in southern Europe – Italy, Spain and Portugal, which only a decade before had been 
sending migrants to wealthier countries in the north, reversed the trend and instead began 
to import workers from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 
 
The collapse of communist regimes and the subsequent political and economic transition 
that took place in central and eastern Europe (CEE) have already had a tremendous 
impact on migration trends in the region. Ethnic conflicts as well as more traditional 
economic motivations have strongly increased cross-border migration. Given all this, the 
possibility of an eastward enlargement has triggered fears of uncontrolled flows of CEE 
migrants in many member states. These perceived risks of enlargement have quickly led 
the EU Commission to adopt a resolution (which was initiated by the German 
Chancellor) suggesting the establishment of a transition period on the free movement of 
people following the accession of the CEE countries (CEEC). Beginning of 2002, a 
compromise was finally reached with the first ten candidate countries in that respect. 
 
Similar transition periods were enforced following the accession of Greece in 1981, and 
then (although they retrospectively proved largely unnecessary) following the accession 
of Spain and Portugal in 1986. Still, the current situation is particularly intriguing. The 
skeptics draw attention to the unparalleled differences in the levels of development 
between the candidate countries and the current member states to warn of disruptive 
flows of migration to follow upon accession. However, others wonder whether such fears 
make sense given the current European demographic trends of declining birth rates and 
aging populations and call for an open-door policy.  
 
Faced with such diverging perspectives, one needs to take some critical distance and 
clarify what is at stake in this debate on the transition period. This paper proceeds in three 
steps. First it starts by setting the economic and demographic stage on which the 
enlargement process is to take place. Second, it identifies and analyzes the likeliness –and 
types– of migratory flows within an enlarged Union in the case of a “full” enlargement  4
option
2. Third, it assesses the possible impact of such flows on the member states’ 
economies and evaluates the desirability –and alternative forms- of “mitigation” 
strategies. It concludes by assessing the compromise recently reached in that respect 
between the European Union and the first ten candidate countries.  
 
1 An extraordinary demographic and economic context for 
enlargement 
 
Three key factors make this enlargement different from the previous ones. First, this 
enlargement will take place in a historically unusual demographic context for Europe. 
Second, the development gap between the candidate countries and the current EU 
members is larger than in earlier enlargements. Third, the flow of persons between the 
candidate countries and the EU is currently constrained by strict regulations. 
 
1.1 Gloomy demographic perspectives for both EU members and 
candidate countries.  
 
As the UN report on replacement migration shows
3, developed countries, Europe in 
particular, are facing an exceptional demographic evolution in the next decades. In 
Europe (which with a broad definition comprises 38 countries including Iceland in the 
west and Russia in the East), for example, the population that was 729 million in 2000 
according to this estimate is expected to drop to 628 million by 2050. This expected 
decline in population in Europe is due to low birth rates that do not allow for generational 
replacement.  
 
This phenomenon is so pronounced that despite an overall increase in life expectancy 
across most of Europe (Russia being a major exception in the last years), natural 
population growth in Europe has been negative since 1993. Some EU countries are 
                                                 
2 Not that it is the only relevant perspective but rather because it is the way the issue had been phrased and discussed so 
far, especially as far as the so-called transitional period is concerned. 
3 Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? (New York: United Nations, 2001).  5
already experiencing an absolute loss of population and the medium-term scenario by the 
UN suggests that the population of the EU will start to decline in absolute numbers by 
2010. In the absence of new migration flows, in 2050, the population will go back to its 
level of 1965 while the proportion of people aged 65 and above will increase from 16% 
in 2000 to 29% in 2050. It must also be stressed that these projections are even more 
pronounced in the non-EU European countries. 
 
Aging in Europe is to a certain extent inescapable as it is for the rest of the world.
4 The 
UN demographic projections have shown
5 the sheer inability of Europe (Japan and Korea 
are comparable or worse situations, for instance) to maintain the existing age group 
structure. In order to keep the population at its present age structure, from 2000 to 2050, 
the current EU member states would need to accept an estimated 12.7 million people a 
year (and 700 millions over the time period.) Maintaining the size of the population of 
working age (15-64) would be somewhat less unrealistic and more desirable but would 
still (based on the 1995-2050 period) require the EU to increase its net migratory flow 
from the base projection of 300,000 persons
6 per year to more than 1.4 million persons. 
 
Simply maintaining the current size of the total population, on the other hand, would 
require increasing the net migratory flow from 300.000 to 860.000 persons per year 
(which is closer to the current level of immigration, if we include the estimates of illegal 
immigrants). In sum, this is the demographic backdrop within which the future 






                                                 
4 Henri Leridon, “Viellissement démographique et migrations:quand les Nations unis veulent remplir le tonneau des 
Danaïdes…” INED, Population et.Sociétés, No. 358 (June 2000), pp. 2-7. 
5 Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? (New York: United Nations, 2001). 
6 This is the UN yearly estimate on the 1995-2050 period, knowing that estimates of recent immigration in the EU are 
around 800.000 persons per year, including 300.000 asylum seekers.  6
1.2 Unparalleled gaps in economic development between the EU 
members and candidate countries 
 
At the beginning of the new Millennium, the candidate countries offer an ambivalent 
face: although quite comparable to the EU average in terms of participation rate
7 and to a 
lesser extent in terms of unemployment rate, they still show a huge development gap in 
comparison to the EU countries. 
 
Ten years of transition have brought about drastic changes in the economies and labor 
markets of the CEE countries. As Hermine Vidovic
8 puts it “In contrast to the pre-
transition period, when the centrally planned economies enjoyed full employment 
coupled with hidden unemployment, labor force has contracted sharply in almost all 
CEECs since 1989”. Three trends characterized the transition process: A soaring open 
unemployment, a massive exit from the labor market and only moderate job creation.  
 
Nowadays, participation rates in CEECs are very comparable with the ones in the 
European Union (Table 1) and the rates of economic growth (Table 2 and 3) are 
significant enough not to expect a sharp rise in the proportion of “forced” inactive people. 
In other words, unlike Northern Africa, for instance, where many immigrants come from, 
the scenario is not one of an abnormally high proportion of inactive population waiting 
for the doors of Europe to open in order to get in en masse.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The participation rate refers to the ratio that is calculated when the total amount of labor force is divided by the total 
population ages 15 to 64. 
8 Hermine Vidovic, “”Synthesis of Recent Labour Market Developments in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries,” in Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe (Paris, France:OECD 
Publications, 2001), pp. 13-31.  7
Table 1- Participation rates in CEECs and selected EU countries 
 
 




Although comparable in magnitude, unemployment rates in the candidate countries are 
higher, on average, than the rates found in the European Union (Table 2 and 3 and Figure 
1 and 2). Some major candidate countries, moreover, have experienced negative trends in 
the last few years (as showed by figure 2). Poland is probably the most worrying case, its 
unemployment rate reaching 17% in 2001.  
  8
Table 2 - GDP and employment, 1990-98 (cumulated growth in %) 
 
Source: Hermine Vidovic, “Synthesis of Recent Labour Market Developments in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries,” p.28.  
 
Table 3 - Overview of Developments 
 
 
Source: Hermine Vidovic, “Synthesis of Recent Labour Market Developments in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries,” p. 26.  
 
Figure 1 - Employment trends in CEECs 
      
Source: Hermine Vidovic, “Synthesis of Recent Labour Market Developments in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries,” p.  30.  
  9
 
Figure 2- Unemployment rates  
 
 
Source: Hermine Vidovic, “Synthesis of Recent Labour Market Developments in the Central and Eastern European 
Countries,” p. 31. 
 
The main and probably most problematic contrast between EU and candidate countries 
relates to their comparatively low levels of GDP per capita (Table 4). Even with an 
annual rate of economic growth per capita twice the level of the one in the EU (4% 
instead of 2%) from 2000 to 2015, not even Slovenia would reach the EU average by 
2015. In the same year, the average income per capita in Poland, the biggest of the 
candidate countries (with 38 millions people), would hardly reach 55% of the EU 
average. 
 
As a result of this development gap, at the end of the first waves of accessions, 
(excluding Turkey) the EU population will increase by 25% to 500 million while its total 
GDP will grow by no more than 5%. Many are concerned that given the size of the 
countries about to join and the current development gap, disruptive flows of 
economically motivated labor migration will arise and jeopardize the whole process of 
European integration.  
  10
Table 4 - GDP per capita at current PPPs (ECU/EUR), from 2000 constant PPPS 
 
Source: Hermine Vidovic, “Synthesis of Recent Labour Market Developments in the Central and Eastern European 





These concerns are reinforced by two elements. The current worsening of unemployment 
in major candidate countries on the one hand – the Czech Republic and Poland in 
particular - and by the apparent effectiveness of the restrictions currently in place, on the 
other hand. Would the removal of these legal barriers open the floodgate to migrants 
from the CEECs?  
 
1.3  A currently limited flow of geographically focused labor mobility 
between candidate countries and the EU 
 
Europe, a traditional source of net emigration, (without underestimating the complexity 
of intra-European movements of population) has after WWII become a pole of net 
immigration from poorer parts of the world.  
 
The size and patterns of immigration have changed markedly in recent decades and vary 
widely among the OECD Countries
9. Most European countries have switched away from 
being emigration nations and, as a result, in most years over the past decades, the 
European Union as a whole has been receiving a net inflow of migrants. 
 
Many studies have shown that as far as the socio-economic level and geographical origin 
of the migrants are concerned, due to a combination of historical, geographical and other 
factors, flows of international migrants usually follow very specific rather than 
homogeneous patterns. In some cases, the colonial past may play a crucial role (the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom or France); in other cases, the geographical location 
(Germany and Austria after the collapse of the Communist block) or a proactive 
immigration policy has played a role (humanitarian or linguistic reasons in Scandinavia, 
an economically motivated approach in Germany with the Gastarbeiter system). 
 
                                                 
9 Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences (Paris, France: OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, 2001).  12
Figure 3 - Arrival of the foreigners into OECD countries in 1998 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p. 7. 
 
 
Net flows of migrants rose through the 1980’s and peaked in the early 1990’s (Figure 4) 
and affect very unequally the host countries (Figure 3). The fall of the “iron curtain” and 
the sparking of a number of civil wars and ethnic conflicts essentially drove these net 
flows. These conflicts have led in particular to an increased number of asylum seekers, 
especially in Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. 
Tighter controls and changes in the domestic laws governing asylum seekers, however, 
have since led to a decline in legal arrivals  13




In the case of CEE countries, the movement of workers - and services - towards the EU 
remains restricted whereas Europe agreements have largely removed the barriers on the 
movement of goods and capital with the EU. Currently, the nationals of the candidate 
countries do not have open access to work in the EU. Since the signature of the Europe 
agreements, it has been up to each individual member state to maintain or introduce, on a 
bilateral basis, specific programs aimed at labor mobility and these programs, as a 
consequence, do not follow harmonized patterns across the EU. Some agreements signed 
(e.g. with Slovenia, Bulgaria and Poland) provide that the spouse and the children of a 
legally employed worker may also work in that country during the period of the worker’s 
authorized stay. Most member states as a rule do not permit labor immigration except if 
the employer can prove that a position cannot otherwise be filled.  
 
One common exception operated by many EU countries consists in the temporary worker 
schemes, such as for seasonal work
10. On the other hand, all Europe agreements have, 
                                                 
10 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement accessed via internet at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/migration_enl.pdf .  14
from the start, granted the right of establishment to candidate country companies, 
branches and agencies. This includes small service companies, even sole proprietorships, 
and in nearly all cases it also includes the establishment of self-employed persons. 
However establishment does not automatically grant the right of movement, as 
companies may only expatriate “key personnel”. 
 
In such a restrictive context, it is then not surprising to find that the flow of labor towards 
the EU has remained very limited since the signature of the Europe agreements, once 
formerly liberal asylum seeker regulations were tightened in countries such as Germany. 
In 2000, the EU’s own figures indicated that nearly 300.000 persons from the candidate 
countries were legally employed in the EU, accounting for 0.2% of the EU workforce, 
representing only 6% of a total of almost 5.3 millions non-EU foreign workers. It should 
also be noted that 70% of them are employed in only two EU countries and “only” 
represent 10% of the non-EU workers there: Germany (where they represent 0.4% of the 
total work force) and Austria (where they represent 1.2% of the total work force). 
Estimates of undocumented workers and migrants from the candidate countries –around 
600.000- can be added to these numbers although most of them are thought not to reside 
in the EU but rather come for short periods of work and then go back home.
 11  
 
When adding the number of legal non-active persons to the number of legal workers from 
the ten CEE countries (Table 5), one clearly sees the geographical patterns of westward 
migration. Poland is by far the major country of emigration, before Romania and it is also 
one of those expected to join the EU in the first enlargement wave.  
Table 5 - Approximate numbers by origin and share of total from CC10 
 
 
Source: European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 30. 
                                                 
11 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 29. These kinds of workers 
are called “working tourist.”   15
 
In conclusion, the flow of migrants from candidate countries towards the EU has so far 
been both very restricted in number (even when illegal immigrants are included) and 
geographically very specific both for the source and the host countries. What does this 
tell us for the post-enlargement period? Would the removal of the current restrictions 
open a floodgate that will lead large masses of migrants not only towards Germany and 
Austria but beyond? Assessing the potential flows of migration is all but easy. We 
address this question in the following section. 
 
 
2  Post-enlargement labor mobility: a strong potential limited by 
contextual factors  
 
Assessing the potential for increased migrations originating from candidate countries 
upon enlargement is a complex matter. It requires an explanatory framework of labor 
mobility and its application to the specific situation highlighted above.  
 
International migration theories show an unparalleled potential for Westward migrations 
in an enlarged European Union, manly on economic grounds. Powerful limiting factors 
could however bind such movements at least in the short and medium run.  
 
2.1  Migration theory and enlargement: a strong potential for labor mobility 
 
Despite a growing literature, the answer to the question of why some people migrate 
remains weak. A broad consensus however exists to locate economic rationales at the 
core of most migratory flows. Although migratory flows may follow very specific and 
“path dependent” patterns at the micro/regional levels, migration specialists can identify 
two interconnected categories of economic factors at the macro level. Push, or supply 
side factors affecting the interest and willingness to emigrate on the one hand and Pull, or 
demand side factors that affect the demand for immigrants in the destination country on 
the other hand.  
  16
Based on that analytical framework, most analysts conclude that the coming wave of 
enlargement has the potential -although with a high degree of uncertainty- to generate 
substantial levels of “East-West” labor mobility.  
The potentially unparalleled influence of the Push factors  
 
The push factor is traditionally looked at from a broad -although progressively amended- 
theoretical perspective of neoclassical economics. This theory focuses on the level of 
individual rational actors who make decisions to migrate based upon a cost-benefit 
calculation that indicates a net positive return to movement.  
 
In this approach all elements that reduce the opportunity cost of immigration (economic 
crisis in the source country, cheaper transportation, reduced costs of migration when it 
becomes legal, etc) and increase the expected benefits (access to legal jobs with better 
wages and benefits for instance) will lead to increased migration. Along these lines, the 
relative income gap between host and source countries is usually thought to be a crucial 
predictor of migrations. 
 
A very approximate verification of this hypothesis can be done by comparing the average 
per capita income between source and host countries - even though doing so one has to 
ignore important factors such as internal distribution of income, probability to find a job 
or not, etc.  
 
As Table 6 shows, all OECD host countries, including all the major European countries 
for which the data is available enjoy a much higher level of GDP per capita than the 
countries where migrants originate.  
  17
Table 6 - Per capita income in source relative to host countries in current PPP $, 
1997 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p. 13. 
  
 
The importance of the development gap between candidate and EU countries (Table 4) 
would therefore lead us to expect an important flow of workers from the newly EU 
member states towards the more developed parts of the Union.  
 
In the case of CEEC, the perspective adopted by the “New Economics” of migration 
underlines an additional Push factor: migration as a way to skirt the home market and 
government failures. When local economies suffer from higher unemployment than the 
host countries, when source countries lack a system of insurance for crops, lack a social 
safety net or a good credit system, many, especially among the poor, may suffer from 
income loss and asymmetric power relationships due to these failures. Besides the 
difference in average income between two countries, the uneven levels of exposure to 
risk may then push individuals to migrate on their own or/and push families -seen here as 
decision makers- to send some of their members abroad in order to insure against risks.  18
Only ten years after the regime changeover, there is no doubt that the CEEC economies 
suffer (although at different levels) from such market failures in a much higher 
proportion than EU countries. 
 
A final Push factor highlighted in the “New Economics” literature concerns the role of 
domestic income gaps in shaping income expectations. As transition countries are usually 
experiencing an increasing level of domestic economic disparity, the latter may fuel some 
increasing desires of economic wealth among the poorer, for which migration can 
become a solution.  
 
In summary, from the “supply side” perspective, powerful Push factors were identified 
that affect the interest and willingness of CEEC nationals to migrate towards the EU. In 
such a context, the full application of the acquis on free movement of labor would have a 
double impact. It would first drastically lower the opportunity cost of immigration for 
those who had already been thinking of migrating, suppressing in particular the additional 
costs associated to illegal immigration -risk and costs of smuggling through borders, 
psychological cost of family separation, risk of ending up in prison, etc. Second, free 
movement of labor upon enlargement would expand the pool of possible migrants for 
whom the cost-benefit comparison becomes positive in this new context. 
 
The case of German reunification offers an almost ideal scenario for Push-motivated 
migration. The economic costs of migrating were low, the opportunity costs even lower, 
with the massive unemployment that arose in the former Eastern Germany just after 
reunification. At the same time, there was no linguistic barrier and a comparatively very 
limited cultural barrier. This resulted in a very fast and massive flow of migration 
westward, representing up to 7% of the source population over 10 years, and 2.8% of the 
source population during the first 6 months.  
 
It is easy to understand how extrapolations for countries like Poland or Romania, based 
on the East German case, have led many to fear a real westward “wave” of migrants once 
CEEC candidates join.   19
 
A progressively redefined and strengthened Pull factor  
 
Many European countries have traditionally filled positions in the service sector as well 
as in import-competing industries with the help of foreign labor. This was especially the 
case in Western Europe during the post-war reconstruction and until the beginning of the 
1970s, when economic growth slowed down at the same time that the bulk of the baby 
boom generation had arrived on the job market. During that initial period, the strength of 
the Pull factor led a number of EU countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
in particular, to clearly promote immigration, especially in favor of unskilled manpower.  
 
This situation drastically changed in the mid 1970s when rising unemployment rates led 
to the implementation of restrictive migration policies. Moreover, the end of the post-war 
“Fordist growth” meant that -all things being equal- European economies did not “need” 
so many of these uneducated immigrants for their industries.  
 
While this tends to currently limit the pull effect for unskilled workers in industries, it is 
also true that the current demographic situation in Western Europe, together with the new 
developments in the service sector may soon counterbalance this earlier evolution and 
underpin a more open approach to immigration from CEE. Three main trends support that 
thesis: 
 
- First of all, it must be stressed that the dual labor market that pulled immigrants towards 
the less prestigious branches of the job market has now spread to countries such as Spain, 
Portugal and Italy, where migrants from poorer regions -North Africa in particular- are 
currently occupying many of these jobs. This continued need for relatively less qualified 
labor is now supported by the strong development of new services (new services to 
persons, in particular, such as support to elderly people, catering, etc). The mere 
availability of such jobs may be sufficient to trigger additional flows of immigrants, even  20
when income differentials between countries are not important
12. In other words, the 
existence of a dual labor market (in which certain categories of jobs are not taken by local 
people) would pull unemployed worker from candidate countries towards the EU. The 
increasing flexibility of the job market in most European countries (short term contracts, 
etc) certainly reinforces this trend, widely opening up the “lower” part of the job market 
to migrants ready to take less “protected” jobs. 
 
- Second, current demographic trends in the EU will directly or indirectly (through public 
policies) strengthen the Pull factors towards the candidate countries. Directly, the 
demographic decline in the EU will create unparalleled job opportunities to CEEC 
citizens at all levels of qualification. Indirectly, the dire demographic situation (simply 
maintaining the population of working age would require the current EU member states 
to almost double their current level of immigration from around 800.000
13 to 1.4 million 
persons per year) makes it very likely that sooner or later governments of the wealthier 
EU countries will design policies to attract immigrants, such as suggested by a 1999 
communication
14 by the European Commission. Figure 5 illustrates this probable 
pressure in favor of active immigration policies. Faced with declining demographic 
trends, EU members have indeed only three ways of maintaining a sufficient labor force 
and a sustainable dependency ratio: reduce the unemployment rate, increase the 
participation rate, or “import” labor through migration. Assuming that spontaneous net 
migration remains stable (at around 600.000 persons a year
15), the two first mechanisms 
will be exhausted rather quickly, calling for a proactive immigration policy.  
                                                 
12 Sharon Stanton Russell, “International Migration: Implications for the World Bank,” accessed via internet at 
http://www.worldbank.org.html/extdr/hnp/hddflash/workp/wp_00054.html on 10 October 2001. 
13 This is already a high point of departure corresponding to the average level in the 1990s, much higher than the UN 
long-term baseline of 300.000 on the 1995-2050 period. 
14 European Commission, Towards a Europe for All Ages: Promoting Prosperity and Intergenerational Solidarity, 
accessed via internet at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-prot/ageing/com99-221/com221_en.pdf. on 
19 February 2002. 
15 The base flow here is higher than the long-term one selected by the UN simulation but slightly lower than the current 
level of immigration in the EU (around 800.000 persons per year).  21




Source: European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 35.  
 
- Finally, it is now clear that this pressure in favor of immigration will this time offer a 
wider scope, well beyond the traditionally lower ladders of the job market. The shortage 
of skilled workers in Europe in a series of sectors -technicians and engineers in the 
information, communication and technology producing and using industries, in 
particular
16- has already boosted the Pull factor in the middle and high segments of the 
job market. These shortages have led several European leaders to argue in favor of an 
active but focused immigration policy in terms of desirable skills, such as reflected in the 
immigration bill currently being discussed in the German Parliament
17.  
 
In conclusion, the economic analysis of migrations (Push and Pull factors) suggests the 
likeliness of massive westward labor mobility towards the EU upon enlargement, were 
the principle of free movement of people fully enforced. Most studies (Table 7) however 
conclude on a much more prudent stance, stressing the existence of limiting factors to 
this mainly economically fueled migratory pressure. 
                                                 
16 Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences (Paris, France: OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, 2001). 
17 The lower house of the Parliament adopted the immigration bill on March 1
st.  22
2.2  A potential for labor mobility limited by contextual limiting factors  
 
Although migration theories conclude on the likeliness of massive westward migration 
upon accession, underpinning fears of massive migrations, four limiting factors need to 
be acknowledged, particularly in the short and medium term context.  
 
From the Push factor perspective, three limiting factors need to be accounted for.  
 
-First, most current EU countries still suffer at different degrees from unemployment and 
will need at least a few more years to reach their “structural” level of unemployment 
(Figure 5). Migrating towards the European Union therefore presents a high degree of 
risk that makes the comparison of wages/income between CEE countries and EU 
countries less relevant when it comes to weight the expected costs and benefits of 
migration.  
-Second, given the important role migrants’ networks play in fostering further migration 
by reducing the cost and uncertainty associated with it, it can be argued that the currently 
very limited stock of CEEC migrants in the EU (around 300.000 persons) is likely to 
limit westward migrations in the short and medium term (the term of a possible transition 
period).  
-Finally and perhaps most importantly, the existence of cultural and linguistic barriers 
combined with a strong demographic decline in the CEE countries seem likely to both 
limit the overall flow of westward migration and canalize migrants towards specific 
regions of the EU.  
 
From the Pull factors perspective, a comparable degree of uncertainty exists as far as the 
social and political acceptability of new migratory flows is concerned.  
 
- As long as many European countries will continue to suffer from massive –and 
currently rising, such as in Germany and France- unemployment, one can doubt the 
spontaneous acceptability of additional migratory flows, limiting the pull effect on CEEC 
migrants.   23
- The same reasons could limit the will of many European Union governments to design 
active immigration policies
18. Until unemployment in the European Union gets closer to 
its structural level (Figure 5), within 10 years or so, it is therefore realistic to downplay 
the strength of the Pull factor.  
 
2.3  Prudent estimates for post enlargement migrations 
Table 7 - Estimates of potential migrations in the EU 15 from the candidate 
countries under conditions of free movement 
 
Source: European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 34. 
61/ Some figures are extrapolations, for the sake of comparability in terms of time span and geographical coverage 
62/ CC8 includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
63/ Excluding Bulgaria, Slovenia and the Baltic States. For the sake of comparability, figures are extrapolated to the 
whole EU from research for Germany, assuming the present distribution of migrants among the EU 15 remains the 
same. 
64/ For the sake of comparability, figures are extrapolated to the whole EU from research results for Austria, assuming 
the present distribution of migrants among the EU 15 remains the same. 
65/Excluding Slovakia and Baltic States  
66/ Excluding Slovenia and Baltic States 
                                                 
18 If successful, the initiative of the German Chancellor to use foreign workers to fill Germany’s urgent skills shortages, 
while at the same time controlling the flow of immigration, could set a precedent.  24
67/ Excluding Baltic States 
 
Numerous studies have tried (summarized in Table 7), using different assumptions and 
methodologies to estimate the post-enlargement flows of migrants. Without entering into 
the details of these studies, three conclusions can be drawn that are relevant for our 
discussion.  
 
- First, the forecasts vary considerably from study to study.  
- Second, the long term stock of CEEC nationals in the rest of the European Union are by 
no means close to what one could have anticipated from the German reunification 
experience. The higher forecast (including workers and their families) represents 4.2 
million people after 15 years, slightly above 1% of the host population (and slightly 
under 4% of the source population) when the 10 candidate countries are considered.  
- Third, the initial annual flows represent (if we systematically adjust for family 
members) from 150.000 to 790.000 persons with an average closer to 250.000 persons, 
not even one tenth of one percent of the host population.  
 
In this context, does the EU really need a transition period before fully enforcing the 
freedom of movement of people within the then enlarged single market? 
 
 
3  What transition period for which purpose?  
 
One thing is to estimate the probable flows of immigrants once CEE countries join the 
EU, and another one is to anticipate the impact of such flows on the receiving economies 
and societies. The debate around the transition period combines these two dimensions.  
 
As mentioned above, most studies conclude that spontaneous labor mobility will be 
limited (less than 1% of the host countries population after 15 years). To what extent such 
increased flows could generate economic disruptions in the receiving countries needs to 
be assessed in order to conclude on the relevance of any transitional scheme. To the 
extent that the transition period by nature does not focus on the long-term effects -
positive or negative- of immigration, we will limit our own assessment to these short and  25
medium term impacts (less than 10 years). To the extent that these schemes also ignore 
the effects on the source countries, we will also leave that facet of the question aside. 
3.1  The macroeconomic consequences of migration: region and sector 
specific risks and opportunities 
 
At the European level and from a long-term perspective, we saw that the current EU 
member states did not need to fear any inflow of foreign population from the candidate 
countries. On the contrary, the overall strength of the Pull factor, progressively reinforced 
by the declining demography in EU 15 should allow CEEC potential immigrants to be 
easily absorbed by their host economies.  
 
The short and medium term consequences of labor mobility on the host countries are 
more ambivalent. Concerns expressed by several European countries have led the 
European Union to suggest the establishment of a 7 years transition period on labor 
mobility upon accession. This proposed scheme is an answer to many individuals and 
political figures that see CEE immigrants mainly as potential competitors for jobs, and to 
a lesser degree as net benefactors of public goods and common pool resources (such as 
social benefits, education, etc). These perceptions tend to shade the complex 
macroeconomic effects of immigration on receiving countries. As soon as one leaves the 
partial equilibrium paradigm applied to the native job market, it actually becomes 
extremely adventurous to predict the final economic effects of migrations.  
 
Most recent studies, backed by the retrospective analysis of previous waves of 
enlargement conclude with a neither/nor answer. As far as unemployment and income 
distribution are concerned, even in the short term, enlargement would neither generate 
very high benefits for the receiving countries nor impose heavy burdens on them. In such 
a context, transitional schemes would be advisable only to handle possible regional 
economic disruptions associated with labor mobility. In no case would there be an 
economic rationale for a global freeze on labor mobility from new members states.  
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3.1.1  Labor migration and unemployment: limited and targeted risks 
 
Although trade and investment have already been largely liberalized and have flourished 
between EU 15 and candidate countries, cross-border macroeconomic convergence
19 is 
far from complete, leaving a potential for westward flows of labor if free movement of 
labor were enforced immediately. Although we concluded that their level would be very 
limited as a proportion of the EU population, it is likely however that some specific 
member states or border regions will witness sizeable increases in migration. Should they 
fear any major economic disruptions? 
 
Leaving aside the complex impact of migration on relative prices and economic welfare 
and focusing on the short and medium term quantitative maladjustments on the job 
market, one first needs to distinguish between sectors/regions suffering from labor 
shortages from the ones suffering from surpluses. To the extent that the EU countries 
already affected by quantitative maladjustments on the labor market, one should wonder 
whether migration has the potential to worsen them at least in the short and medium term. 
Economic sectors currently suffering from shortages of labor (computing industry, 
farming for seasonal workers, etc) would benefit from the inflow of migrants offering 
these skills. The concern naturally focuses more on the other sectors of the economy, 
when some particular skills are already overabundant either nationally or at the regional 
level.  
 
Past experiences as well as most studies
20 suggest that previous episodes of immigration 
in Europe have had no serious impact on native unemployment and may even have been 
beneficial for the economy since, in the long term, it acts as a source of flexibility. 
Neither is there any obvious link in OECD countries between the proportion of the 
foreign population and the level of unemployment (Figure 6).  
                                                 
19 Assuming, in the very optimistic neoclassical (H-O-S) way, that free movement of goods, services and capital 
progressively trigger economic convergence across the borders. As we know, “New regionalism” approaches do not 
necessarily share this view. However, whether or not convergence occurs, whether or not trade and migration end up as 
complements or substitutes does not change our conclusions in the short term: the absence of convergence leaves a 
strong potential for labor mobility. Cf for instance OECD 2001, chap 6 Landesman p 108. 
20 Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences , p.1.  27
Figure 6 - Immigration and unemployment rates in OECD countries, 1998 
 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences,  p. 15. 
 
Moreover, the declining demographic trends in the European Union will progressively 
create a scarcity of labor, making these fears of migration-based economic disruptions 
unfounded.  
 
Although this may be true, it is also clear that such positive effects may be delayed 
whereas short term quantitative unbalances on the labor market may occur, providing 
some political legitimacy to the supporters of immigration control.  
 
The fact that native unemployment does not seem to be strongly affected by the inflow of 
migrants does not mean that migrants would not find themselves unemployed in a higher 
proportion than the native population, at least in the short term, pulling the average 
unemployment rate of the host country up. If this were the case, at least in a first stage, 
the effects on the welfare systems and on the overall GDP per-capita would clearly be 
detrimental to the host countries. Such fears appear to be supported by simple static 
comparisons of the levels of unemployment between nationals and foreign-born in the 
host country. Clear evidence indeed shows that in all European Union countries (and 
OECD countries in general) the unemployment rates are generally much higher for 
foreign-born than for natives (Figure 7).  28
 
Figure 7 - Foreign born and native unemployment rates (Average 1995 as percent of 
the foreign born and native labor forces) 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p.17. 
1/ Data refer to 1996  2/ Data refer to 1998  3/ Data refer to 1995-97  4/ Data refer to 1997  
5/ Data refer to foreigners and nationals instead of foreign-born and native 
Although with time the differences progressively disappear for each cohort of migrants, 
short term increases in the average rate of unemployment in Western Europe could not be 
excluded in the event of a substantial East-West migration.  
 
A worsening of regional quantitative imbalances on the labor market is therefore likely in 
the short and medium run, especially in the border regions migrants may be more likely 
to head towards. This could be politically difficult especially in countries/regions that 
have recently seen a substantial rise in their level of foreign-born populations, as former 
cohorts of migrants may still be in the process of converging towards the native standards 
as far as unemployment rates are concerned.  
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Table 8 - Foreign and foreign-born population in selected OECD countries 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p.10. 
 
Germany, Denmark, and even more clearly, Austria, face such a situation. With a 
massive increase in the presence of foreign-born workers, on the one hand (Table 8), and 
a sizeable difference in unemployment rates between foreign born and native workers, on 
the other hand (Figure 7), it is no wonder that the strongest opposition to full enlargement 
options comes from these 3 countries. 
 
The case of Poles in Germany is interesting in this respect. Statistics for 1997 and 1998 
for instance show that the Poles had already become the main group of immigrants, and 
represent more than 10% of the total flow
21, although they still represented only 3.8% of 
the stock of foreigners in Germany. How many more of them would migrate to Germany 
if free movement of persons was enforced? 
                                                 
21 Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p. 9.  30
 
 
Table 9 - Border-Region in the European Union and the candidate countries 
 
Source: European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 37. 
 
 
As Table 9 shows, a close look at the border regions in the European Union and the 
candidate countries reveals indeed the vulnerability of some specific regions (mainly in 
Germany and Austria but also in Italy and in Greece, although in this last case Bulgaria  31
will certainly not be part of the first wave of accession) to westward migration. This 
vulnerability is largely due to the strength of the Push factor, with clear differences in 
GDP per capita across the borders as well as, in many cases, a higher rate of 
unemployment in the border regions of the candidate countries.  
 
In the case of some Polish and Bulgarian border regions, an additional factor may play a 
role as Table 9 indicates. The existence of a relatively lower employment rate (in other 
words, a lower participation rate) in these regions, suggesting a level of 
underemployment superior to what could be concluded from the sole unemployment 
rates. 
 
Border regions of Germany and Austria are particularly vulnerable due to the fact that in 
the last 10 years migrant networks were created, which could play a role in making new 
migrations (and commuting) easier and quicker. Politically, such an evolution would 
particularly be problematic in Austria where the stock of foreign-born population already 
skyrocketed from 4.5% in 1988 to 9.1% in 1998. It must also be stressed that effects of 
enlargement on the job market of border regions are likely to be linked to “commuters
22” 
as well as real migrants. The few studies available
23 in the case of Germany and Austria 
indicate that the sole share of commuters in the labor force of the border regions could 
range from 1% to 8%, with a stronger impact in the urban areas. 
 
3.1.2  The impact on income distribution 
 
As Hubertus Hille and Thomas Straubhaar concluded in another study: “Free migration 
proves to be a typical allocation phenomenon without any major threat for any of the two 
European regions. Merely EU’s blue collar workers might get nervous in view of 
potentially falling wages and could oppose the idea of free labour mobility”
 24 
 
                                                 
22 Daily commuters as well as weekly/monthly commuters. 
23 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, P 37 
24 Hubertus Hille and Thomas Straubhaar, “The Impact of the EU-Enlargement on Migration Movements and 
Economic Integraion: Results of Recent Studies,” in in Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: The Case of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Paris, France:OECD Publications, 2001), pp. 79-100.  32
Although traditional factorial approaches conclude that migrations are a positive sum 
game, it is also true that the costs and benefits are not necessarily evenly distributed. The 
impact of labor mobility on income distribution is actually very difficult to spell out with 
certainty and differs from case to case. It largely depends on the transformations in factor 
intensities triggered by the number and nature (nature of the skills, etc) of the immigrants 
in a given situation. It also depends on the complementary or substitutable nature of this 
new labor force relative to preexisting one. The size of wage effects from migration is 
also a function of very imperfectly known (and perhaps changing as a result of migration, 
as some researchers suggest
25) wage elasticity of labor demand and native labor supply.  
 
Studies of reference in the case of the USA, Germany and France,
26 for instance, show 
that high flows of migration had very little impact on wages. In the case of the US, for 
example, Friedberg and Hunt estimate that a 10% increase in the fraction of immigrants 
in the population reduces native wages by at most 1 per cent.
27 At a more disaggregated 
level however, the same study in the USA and a study on Germany by De New and 
Zimmerman in 1994
28 indicate that the impact on wages may be stronger: positive for 
highly qualified native workers, negative for low skilled native workers. 
 
Precisely, different studies show to what extent the characteristics of the foreign 
population differ in terms of level of education. This is the case in all major OECD 
countries, including major EU member states, as table 10 shows. 
                                                 
25 Dani Rodrik, “Globalisation and labour, or:if globalisation is a bowl of cherries, why are there so many glum faces 
around the table?” in Richard Baldwin et al., ed., Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1999), pp  117-152. 
26 Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, pp. 15-16. 
27 Friedberg and Hunt quoted in Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p.15. 
28 Referred to by Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences , p.15. 
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Table 10 - Foreign and national adult populations classified by level of education in 
selected OECD countries 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p. 11. 
 
It is therefore likely that labor mobility from CEE countries could affect specific groups 
of workers in specific regions of the receiving countries, mainly in the less skilled niches 
of the industry and service sectors. As far as wages are concerned, however, the existence 
of fairly stringent regulations in most European countries, Germany and Austria included, 
sets the lower limit of the distributional impact of migration.  
 
The most probable consequence of migration is the increase in the proportion of people 
working at or around the minimum wage, enlarging the gap between the average income 
of qualified people and the one of the non or less qualified and pushing the European 
Union a little closer to the Anglo-Saxon economies in that respect 
29 
 
At the less disaggregated level of industry division, available evidence (Table 11) on the 
employment of foreigners and nationals confirms the strong and often overrepresentation 
of foreign-born workers in the industry sector
30, especially in Germany and Austria, the 
two potentially major recipients of CEEC migrants. It is therefore very likely that 
industry workers will be the primary victims of the inflow of CEE migrants, as far as 
their wages are concerned.  
                                                 
29 Dani Rodrik, “Globalisation and labour, or: if globalisation is a bowl of cherries, why are there so many glum faces 
around the table?” p. 120. 
30 Data at a more disaggregated level would allow for a more precise analysis.  34
 
Table 11 - Employment of foreigners and nationals by industry division (Proportion 
of. total employment of foreigners and nationals 1995-1998 average) 
 
Source: Jonathan Coppel et al., Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, p. 12. 
 
 
3.2  What kind of transition period, if any? 
 
As seen above, the debate around the transition period essentially revolves around two 
major concerns: falling wages for non/less skilled workers on the one hand, and regional 
surges in unemployment on the other hand. Faced with these very specific and targeted 
risks, what kind of transition period would be appropriate, if any? This debate has come 
to an end beginning of 2002 when the separate negotiations with the ten countries set to 
join the European Union by 2004 concluded. Negotiations have not yet ended with 
Bulgaria and Romania, though. To understand the compromise that was recently reached,  35
we need to take one step back and look into the options that were available with their 
pros and cons, and draw the lessons of earlier transitional arrangements.  
 
3.2.1  A typology of the options available 
 
In 2001, the European Commission identified five possible options
31 for the seven years 
transition period.  
 
Option 1: Full and immediate application of the acquis 
 
Among the pros, it is clearly consistent with the general principle of adopting the acquis 
by the date of accession, it allows the normal interplay of the four freedoms, safeguards 
the geographic unity of the single market and avoids complex additional negotiations. 
However, this option may ignore the sensitivity of public opinion and may be politically 
dangerous for the stability of the Union in the short term. When faced with such 
challenges in the past (for instance when Spain and Portugal joined), the Community 
chose a prudent approach and this time, once again,  the full and immediate application of 
the acquis does not seem realistic.  
 
Option 2: Safeguard clauses 
 
Here the general principle of the application of the acquis is respected but some 
flexibility is built in as safeguard clauses allow member states to impose temporary 
restrictions when and where labor markets become disrupted, during the 7 years period.  
 
One possibility is to have safeguard clauses triggered by an ad hoc assessment of the 
labor market situation in a given country/region. The difficulty obviously derives from 
the political sensitivity of the criteria or/and indicators used in such an assessment, each 
stakeholder (region, country, Commission) being tempted to chose different ones if 
allowed to.  
 
                                                 
31 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 18.  36
In order to avoid such conflicts, the implementation/continued application of such clauses 
may be subject to a Commission recommendation or authorization.  
 
Alternatively, criteria and indicators can be predefined on a more objective basis, less 
subject to interpretation. The safeguard clauses could for instance be triggered when a 
specific predefined threshold is reached, such as a percentage of migrant workers in the 
local/regional workforce, or when a specific rate of unemployment is reached, etc. 
Clauses may also be tailored so as to target specific regions of origin. 
 
Although less “democratic”, the strength of this option lays in its predictable and almost 
automatic nature. The criteria and procedures set in the Maastricht Treaty relating to the 
European Monetary Union can offer a useful inspiration in this respect. Moreover, 
safeguard clauses have been used many times in the history of the European Union, 
making them well known and well-accepted tools.  
 
Option 3: flexible system of transitional arrangements 
 
Instead of allowing countries to implement safeguard clauses in case of disruptions, this 
option allows broad restrictions to freedom of movement to be enforced from the 
beginning, then allowing each country to lower and remove them at a different pace (and 
possibly at a different time in different regions of a country). This system needs to be 
well coordinated by the Commission since overcomplicated non-coordinated “a la carte” 
solutions (such as the current bilateral agreements between EU member states and 
candidate countries) could end up being technically and politically unmanageable.  
 
A way to limit the multiplication of uncoordinated national/regional transitional 
arrangements could be to strictly define the kind of initial restrictions to be authorized 
and have them be automatically reviewed after a pre-defined short period of time (or 
upon request of some member states). This institutionalized scrutiny would allow for the 
transitional period to be shortened where possible, and for restrictions to be weakened in 
a coordinated way, while still allowing member states that can justify it to use a 
predefined set of restrictive measures until the end of the transition period.   37
 
A slightly different solution would be to combine a EU wide review mechanism with the 
obligation for all countries to downgrade their restrictions, if any, at the same time. The 
main advantage is to limit the complication of the system by preventing countries to 
implement different sets of safeguard clauses; the main risk would be to allow one 
country to block the downgrading of restrictions to labor mobility until the initially 
agreed upon final deadline. 
 
It is also conceivable to combine options 2 and 3 in a mixed system, limited in time, 
allowing for each individual member state to “opt for the application of the freedom of 
movement with a safeguard clause from the date of accession or for a transition period 
which is subject to review”.
32  
 
Option 4: establishment of a fixed quota system 
 
In theory, the principal advantage of quotas and quantitative restrictions is that they “give 
a sense of security and predictability on both sides of the border. They can also be 
modulated to take account of vulnerable sects and/or regions, and to take into account 
needs in some sectors and regions for additional labour”
33  However, discriminating 
against or in favor of some categories of population may not only be at odds with the 
political culture of most EU countries -few EU countries have experience with this 
system- but it could also create serious difficulties upstream during the negotiation 
process with the candidate countries. Moreover, as quotas are inflexible by nature 
(although some adjustments are possible), they need to be wisely defined and targeted 
from the beginning and thus, may be difficult and cumbersome to enforce.  
 
Option 5: general non-application of the acquis for a limited period of time 
 
The status quo is the last conceivable option and would simply extend the current 
situation for another 7 years: non-application of the acquis would remain the rule while 
bilateral agreements between Member States and candidate countries would allow for 
                                                 
32 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 23. 
33 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement, p. 23.  38
some marginal movements of population. This system would fully reassure populations 
in member states but would clearly be politically unacceptable as contrary to the very 
spirit of European integration. 
 
The status quo would also be economically inefficient, preventing the normal interplay of 
the four freedoms of the single market. Some countries could, however, benefit from such 
a system if they managed through bilateral agreements to attract the type and quantity of 
labor necessary to their respective economies. The status quo could then turn into a 
competition between Member States to attract the “right” CEECs workers, enhancing the 
negotiation position of the CEECs and triggering conflicts of interests between EU 
countries. Under such rules of the game, CEECs and EU Member States could 
progressively find themselves in an intriguing situation of bilateral oligopoly on the 
“market” for CEECs workers, with unpredictable results.  
 
3.2.2  The lessons of past experiences  
 
Freedom of movement of labor was progressively introduced in the EU and it was only in 
1968 that it became a reality (at least from a legal perspective) for all workers. In the 
most recent enlargement to include Austria, Sweden and Finland, the rules on free 
movement of workers were already applicable before accession under the European 
Economic Area agreements.  Movement of workers never became a concern to other EU 
members, all the more that these three countries enjoyed a relatively higher level of 
GDP/head and had a small population.  
 
The case of German reunification was a special case and although we saw above how 
powerful the flow or worker was (more than 7% of the source population over 10 years 
and 2.8% of the East German population during the first 6 months), this experience 
cannot be simply transposed to the current candidate countries for obvious reasons.  
 
The most relevant reference models for the next enlargement are the accessions of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. In those cases, significant concerns existed in relation to  39
expected labor migration based on considerations such as income differentials, high 
propensity to migrate and geographical proximity. Spain and Portugal in particular had a 
long tradition of emigration towards Western Europe and the development gap remained 
important at the time of accession, although much inferior to the current one with CEEC. 
 
In this context, member states agreed to impose a seven-year transition period during 
which bilateral agreements would basically govern the hiring of Spanish and Portuguese 
nationals (through the issuance of work permits). Members of the family of a legal 
worker would gain the right to work either immediately if they had already been staying 
with the worker at the time of the accession treaty, or progressively otherwise. In any 
case, member states were not allowed to impose new restrictions to the entry and hiring 
of Spanish and Portuguese nationals.  
 
During the transition period, only 1000 Spanish and 6000 Portuguese nationals would 
apply for such work permits and the expiry of the transition period did not produce a 
break in the trend. The number of migrants from Portugal increased somewhat in the 
following years while the flow of Spanish ones did not. Family members included, the 
yearly net flow from both countries never passed 30.000 and then started to decline 
(partially due to increasing reverse migration). In other words, the transition period had 
been useless and in 1991, at the planned 5 years review of the transitional regime, 
following the advice of the Commission report, member states agreed to cut the transition 




The current state of integration between the CEE countries and the EU is characterized by 
limited labor flows, but strong trade integration and increasing capital market integration. 
Although labor flows may increase after accession and potentially disrupt specific 
regions and economic sectors of the member states, the effects will remain very limited 
from a macroeconomic perspective. This predominance of trade and capital integration 
on labor market integration will most likely develop after accession just as it 
characterizes the state of integration between the current EU member states.   40
 
In this context, the full application of the acquis regarding labor mobility (option 1) 
seems realistic just a few years after accession and option 5 (the non application of the 
acquis for 7 more years) is clearly inappropriate. Transitional arrangements are however 
necessary not to tackle potential EU wide disruptions but rather to allow specific regions 
and economic sectors to smoothly adapt to the new deal. To the extent that migration 
flows will be limited and probably very region specific, the transitional arrangements will 
need as much flexibility as possible both in the nature of the measures and in their timing, 
excluding option 4 (establishment of a fixed quota system). At the same time, the need to 
keep a high level of homogeneity, transparency and predictability in the workings of the 
European Union invites rejection of overcomplicated “a la carte” national measures and 
rather suggest a “menu” approach that would give the European Commission a strong 
coordinating role.  
 
In that respect, the compromise finally reached beginning of 2002
34 with the ten countries 
set to join the Union by 2004 is quite satisfactory for two crucial reasons. First it 
essentially consists in a combination of safeguard clauses (option 2) and flexible system 
of transitional arrangements/national measures (option 3). Second, it sets a clear calendar 
with automatic reviews and gives the Commission a strong coordinating role even though 
it leaves the final decisions in the hand of member states as far as phasing out transitional 
arrangements/national measures and implementing safeguard measures are concerned. 




A two year period during which national measures will be applied by current Member 
States to new Member States. Depending on how liberal these national measures are, they 
may result in full labor market access. Following this period, reviews will be held, one 
automatic review before the end of the second year and a further review at the request of 
                                                 
34 It has been provisionally closed for Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia during the Swedish Presidency and 
for the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia during the Belgian Presidency. The chapter has been 
provisionally closed for Estonia during the Spanish Presidency. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap2/index.htm accessed April 25th 2002. 
35 For obvious reason, the EU has not requested a transition period in relation to Malta and Cyprus.  41
the new Member State. The procedure includes a report by the Commission, but 
essentially leaves the decision on whether to apply the acquis up to the Member States. 
The transition period should come to an end after five years, but it may be prolonged for 
a further two years in those Member States where there are serious disturbances of the 
labor market or a threat of such disruption. Finally, safeguards may be applied by 
Member States up to the end of the seventh year.  
 
The transition arrangement also includes a number of other important aspects, such as a 
standstill clause, whereby current Member State labor markets cannot be more restricted 
than that prevailing at the time of the signature of the Accession Treaty. Also current 
Member States must from the beginning give preference to candidate country nationals 
over non-EU labor. A declaration will also be attached to the Accession Treaty stating 
that current Member States shall endeavor to grant increased labor market access under 
national law, with a view to speeding up the approximation to the acquis and even an 
encouragement to improve access before accession.  
 
Finally, due their particular vulnerability, Austria and Germany have the right to apply 
flanking national measures to address serious disturbances or the threat thereof, in 
specific sensitive service sectors on their labor markets, which could arise in certain 
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